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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION POLICY 
MITSUO MATSUSHITA 
I. THE SHRINKING WORLD AND COMPETITION POLICY 
In the nineteenth century, a German jurist, Rudolf Von Ihering, stated: 
“While the States were fighting one another, trade found out and levelled the 
roads that lead from one nation to another, and established between them a 
relation of exchange of goods and ideas . . .”1 In the twenty-first century in 
which we live, Ihering’s statement applies with even more validity than at the 
time he made it. Transnational activities are expanding at an unprecedented 
rate and it is expected that this trend will accelerate through the growth of e-
commerce and computer networks. 
It is the nature of business to cut across national boundaries. Private 
enterprises export, invest, transfer technology, and engage in all sorts of 
business activities across national boundaries in pursuit of profit. Such 
activities tend to increase the wealth of trading nations, which was the 
original objective of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Today the international trading system consists of the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and other international institutions that aim to 
maximize the wealth of nations.  
At the same time, the nation-state system is still the reality throughout the 
world, and the legal or regulatory framework to control trade is that of 
national governments. National objectives and competition law and 
policy differ from country to country. This may create tension among 
trading nations, which, in turn, may create instability for enterprises that 
conduct business across national boundaries. 
The differences in competition law and policy among major trading 
nations often create a disparity in competitive conditions, which ultimately 
may cause the ease or difficulty of accession to the national market of 
other trading nations to vary. For example, if Country A’s competition law 
  Professor of Law, Seikei University. 
 1. RUDOLF VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 175 (Isaak Husik trans., 1913), quoted 
in 1 SIDNEY POST SIMPSON & JULIUS STONE, LAW AND SOCIETY 313 (1948). 
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prohibits a boycott to exclude foreign products but it is allowed in Country 
B, enterprises in Country B are at an advantage over their counterparts in 
Country A. In Country B, enterprises can exclude foreign competing 
products with impunity while enterprises in Country A cannot. This creates 
the sentiment that Country B’s lax enforcement of competition law is 
unfair to enterprises of Country A, which could result in trade friction 
between the two countries.  
The situation described above shows that international cooperation 
among trading nations with regard to the implementation and enforcement 
of competition law and policy is necessary, and that some degree of 
convergence or harmonization of competition laws is desirable. Of course, 
the national traditions and unique circumstances of each nation should be 
respected, as the competition law and policy of each nation reflect such 
traditions and circumstances. However, one should recall that since the 
time of the Havana Charter, the establishment of international competition 
policy has been an important subject among international policymakers. It 
has been discussed in international arenas such as the GATT, OECD, 
UNCTAD, European Community, and, currently, WTO. Especially 
important is the establishment of a working group at the WTO commissioned 
to study the relationship between trade and competition and subsequently 
recommend to the WTO what policy it should follow. The working group 
already has published several reports detailing the positives and negatives of 
introducing an agreement on competition policy into the WTO.2 The draft 
charter of the International Trade Organization (the Havana Charter) 
included Chapter V, which dealt with restrictive business activities such as 
price fixing and the division of markets. Due to the abortion of the Havana 
Charter, Chapter V was put into limbo. However, the recent talks at the 
WTO of introducing competition policy into the WTO may be a sign of the 
resurrection of this concept. 
The need for introducing an international cooperative framework for 
competition policy has become an important subject matter for international 
discussions. Globalization of economies necessitates that there should be 
more international cooperation among trading nations with respect to 
competition law and policy. Multinational or transnational business 
 2. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Interaction 
Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11, 
1999); World Trade Organization, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between 
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998); 
World Trade Organization, Report (1997) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and 
Competition Policy to the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/WGTCP/1 (Nov. 28, 1997). 
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enterprises can engage in activities in such a way that no one nation’s 
jurisdiction can control such activities effectively. For example, 
multinational enterprises can conceal evidence necessary to prosecute them 
from the authority of one nation by utilizing international connections and 
transferring such evidence from that jurisdiction to another. To cope with 
this situation, domestic authorities in some jurisdictions (most notably the 
United States) have extended the scope of application of their domestic laws 
to conduct that occurs outside their territories.3 The above situation 
symbolizes that, in the era of economic globalization, the enforcement of 
competition law and policy by each nation is insufficient and the gap 
between the international nature of business activities and the insularity of 
national jurisdiction is widening.  
Today, many transnational mergers and acquisitions (M & A) occur. 
The agencies that enforce competition laws in many nations require that 
M & A be reported if the transactions exceed a certain threshold in terms 
of assets and market shares, even if the transactions occur outside the 
nations’ borders. The reporting requirements may be different from one 
jurisdiction to another. This imposes a tremendous burden on enterprises 
carrying out M & A.4 
In some situations, M & A that are allowed or encouraged in one 
jurisdiction may be prohibited in another. Recently, General Electric (GE) 
attempted to acquire Honeywell. Both are U.S. companies that conduct 
business in the aviation equipment industry. This acquisition passed 
antitrust scrutiny in the United States but was rejected by the European 
Community because it purportedly would create undue market power for 
GE among the member states of the Community.5 This kind of conflicting 
enforcement policy of competition laws creates a tremendous uncertainty 
within business communities. The GE-Honeywell merger is yet another 
example of the need to coordinate the enforcement policies of 
competition laws of different nations.  
 3. See JAMES R. ATWOOD, KINGMAN BREWSTER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST 
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD §§ 14.1-14.25 (3d ed. 1997).  
 4. See generally INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS (J. William Rowley & 
Donald I. Baker eds., 2d ed. 1996) (discussing antitrust regulation of mergers and acquisitions in 
various nations).  
 5. See Mergers and Acquisitions: EU Commission Bars Acquisition of Honeywell by General 
Electric, 81 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 14 (July 6, 2001); Mergers and Acquisitions: Antitrust 
Division Chief Reacts to EU Decision to Prohibit GE/Honeywell Deal, 81 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 
REP. (BNA) No. 128, at 15 (July 6, 2001). 
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II. COOPERATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION POLICY 
AND LAW 
A. Forms of International Cooperation in Competition Law 
There are several kinds of cooperation among competition law 
enforcement agencies: (a) bilateral agreements between two nations; (b) 
regional agreements; (c) plurilateral agreements; and (d) multilateral 
agreements. There are many bilateral agreements entered into between two 
nations in which the terms for the cooperative relationship in the 
enforcement are stipulated. There are, for example, the agreements 
between the United States and the European Union,6 the United States and 
Canada,7 Australia and New Zealand,8 and the United States and Japan.9 
There is a strong likelihood that there will be a similar one between the 
European Communities and Japan before long. 
Bilateral and regional agreements on competition policy are the only 
types of international cooperative agreements on competition policy that 
exist today. The most successful and far-reaching regional agreement is 
the European Community. However, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) and the Merger 
Regulation10 probably should be likened to a national competition law 
rather than an international cooperative agreement on competition laws. 
The European Community as a whole should be regarded as one 
jurisdiction as far as the enforcement of competition laws is concerned. 
Other than this, some regional arrangements like the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) include provisions for competition policy.  
 6. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of 
the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 
U.S.-E.U., reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,504. See also Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the European Communities on the Application of 
Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, June 3-4, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
1070 (entered into force June 4, 1998).  
 7. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, 
Aug. 3, 1995, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,503. 
 8. Australia-New Zealand: Closer Economic Relations–Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1983, 22 
I.L.M. 945 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1983). 
 9. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, U.S.-Japan, reprinted in 4 
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,507 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Agreement]. 
 10. Council Regulation 4064/89, O.J. (L 395) 1 (1989), amended by Council Regulation 1310/97, 
O.J. (L 180) 1 (1997). 
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned regional agreements, bilateral 
agreements prove to be the most successful for several reasons. First, it is 
easier for two parties to reach an agreement than for many parties to do so. 
Second, a bilateral agreement can address issues that are important to the 
two parties concerned. Third, a proliferation of bilateral agreements will 
create a network of such agreements and could pave the way for a 
plurilateral or multilateral agreement through the accumulation of 
experiences in international cooperation in competition law matters, thereby 
creating the spirit of cooperation among the officials of enforcement 
agencies. In light of such experience, bilateral agreements on competition 
policy should be promoted in spite of their inherent limitations.  
In a plurilateral agreement, parties conclude an agreement setting forth 
principles to be observed by the parties. The membership is not as 
comprehensive as in a multilateral agreement in which all or the majority of 
nations with competition laws are parties. An agreement that includes all of 
the members of the OECD or WTO would be regarded as a multilateral 
agreement (e.g. the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs)). The membership of a plurilateral agreement may 
be few or many. Even if a plurilateral agreement is concluded within the 
framework of a large international organization such as the WTO, the entry 
is optional. Plurilateral agreements can be included within the framework of 
the WTO in Annex IV. However, a plurilateral agreement need not be 
enacted within the framework of an international organization. It can stand 
unilaterally. 
A plurilateral agreement is probably more practical than a comprehensive 
multilateral agreement. For example, we can envisage a plurilateral 
agreement among major industrial nations, or an agreement among the 
“quad” (Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the United States) 
member countries of the WTO, plus Australia, New Zealand, Korea, 
Taiwan, and certain Latin American nations. There is no plurilateral 
agreement on competition policy currently enforced today. However, if 
tailored properly, a plurilateral agreement can be a useful instrument for the 
cooperative relationship among nations concerning international competition 
policy. In order for such an agreement to be successful, it is important that 
the number of nations party to the agreement remain small, that there are 
sufficient common interests among the participants, and that the membership 
is voluntary. 
A multilateral agreement originally was proposed as Chapter V of the 
Havana Charter, which never came into existence. It is not foreseeable at 
present that anything resembling Chapter V of the Havana Charter will be 
formulated and implemented. However, multilateralism serves as an 
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ultimate goal for any agreement on international competition policy. 
Hopefully, there will be a time in the future that the globalization of 
economies has progressed to the point that a multilateral agreement on 
international competition policy can become a reality.  
B. A “Non-Binding Law” Approach vs. a ”Mandatory Law” Approach  
A non-binding agreement is a type of agreement in which obligations 
contained therein are hortatory in nature and are not compulsory on the 
contracting parties to implement within their domestic laws. For example, 
there may be an agreement that requests the participants harmonize their 
domestic laws as much as possible but does not require them to do so. There 
may be a provision within that requests each party to supply evidence to 
the other and exchange information with regard to the enforcement of 
competition laws, and yet leaves the ultimate implementation to the 
discretion of each party. In international law, this type of agreement may 
be referred to as a “soft law,” as opposed to a “hard law,” which requires 
contracting parties to observe the terms of an agreement.  
In a mandatory agreement, the participants are required to observe the 
terms of the agreement and modify their domestic laws according to the 
mandates of the agreement (if necessary). For example, a mandatory 
agreement may require the participants to change their domestic laws and 
regulations so that they meet the minimum requirements set forth in the 
agreement.  
All bilateral agreements that exist today are non-binding “soft” laws. 
They stipulate such matters as cooperation in investigation, exchanges of 
information, notifications of actions that each party takes that affect 
enterprises of the other party, and positive and negative comity. The 
provisions in those agreements generally do not require changes in the 
parties’ domestic laws and leave discretion to each party as to whether to 
take action under the agreement. For example, the U.S.-Japan Agreement 
provides that each party should exchange information because it would 
assist in the enforcement of competition laws. However, neither the United 
States nor Japan is obligated to submit to the other information that it 
believes it should not submit. Confidential information is specifically 
excluded from the coverage of this agreement.  
The OECD Recommendation,11 which is a multilateral agreement, also is 
 11. OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member 
Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, July 27-28, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 
1313, 1314-16 (1996). 
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non-binding. Within the OECD, a party whose actions affect enterprises of 
another member should notify the affected member of the actions. 
However, this is the only proffered guidance. Neither the notifying party nor 
the notified party is required to take, or refrain from taking, any action 
beyond the notification. 
A typical example of a mandatory agreement is the EC Treaty,12 which 
creates an international agreement binding on all member states of the 
Community. If an agreement on international competition policy is 
incorporated into the framework of the WTO, it is likely to be mandatory in 
nature if it is drafted based on the example of existing WTO agreements like 
the TRIPs Agreement. The mandatory nature of such an agreement would 
obligate a party to the agreement to implement the contents of the agreement 
domestically. For example, if such an agreement provides for the prohibition 
of cartels and boycotts, the members would be obligated to enact domestic 
laws containing the same prohibitions. Non-implementation of a mandatory 
agreement would violate the agreement, and a non-implementing party 
could be challenged at an appropriate forum and receive sanctions for 
noncompliance.  
There are advantages and disadvantages to both non-binding and 
mandatory types of agreements. However, given the fact that there is little 
consensus among nations as to the objectives, forms, and enforcement 
processes of competition laws, it would be difficult to enact a bilateral, 
plurilateral, or multilateral agreement that legally would compel the parties 
to subject their domestic norms to international disciplines. In fact, this is 
probably the reason why all bilateral agreements on competition policy are 
of a non-binding nature. The effect of such an agreement is limited since 
the parties legally are not obligated to execute the mandates of the agreement 
and possess a wide scope of discretion. However, such an agreement would 
create the framework for cooperation and, in spite of its discretionary 
nature, contribute to the promotion of international cooperation. After 
accumulating experiences of this type of international agreements, in the 
long run, a “hard law” type of agreement likely will come into existence. 
Outside of the European Union, national jurisdictions are the only forum 
in which competition law can be implemented effectively with the force of 
law. International agreements on competition law and policy supplement 
national enforcement of competition laws with support, opitulation, and 
vigor. 
 12. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
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C. Positive and Negative Comity 
Positive comity is incorporated within many bilateral international 
agreements. Positive comity means that a party to an agreement invokes, 
upon request of the other, its domestic competition law to remove 
anticompetitive practices that occur within its jurisdiction and that adversely 
affect the other party. This is a way to control anticompetitive activities that 
adversely affect a party without resorting to an extraterritorial application of 
its competition law that may result in a conflict of jurisdiction. 
Positive comity is a device to promote international cooperation in the 
enforcement of competition laws. It is effective in prohibiting or 
controlling anticompetitive conduct carried out across the boundaries of 
more than one nation. When, for example, a cartel or boycott excludes the 
export of a product from one nation to another and yet the situs of the 
conduct is located where the affected nation may not have jurisdiction, the 
affected nation may invoke the principles of positive comity. Competition 
laws may have extraterritorial application,13 but usually extraterritorial 
application is not as effective as one would hope. 
In such a situation, a positive comity approach can play a useful role. 
When the effects of a cartel or boycott cut across the boundaries of more 
than one nation, the nation affected may request the nation in which the 
cartel or boycott originates to take action vis-a-vis this cartel in its territory. 
If the host country takes action, the conduct in question can be controlled 
effectively. 
In United States v. Nippon Paper Industries,14 U.S. and Canadian 
authorities cooperated closely in their investigation of a Japanese cartel in 
which several paper mills fixed the price of fax paper to be sold in the 
United States and Canada. Their close cooperation resulted in the successful 
criminal enforcement of U.S. and Canadian competition laws against this 
cartel. 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of positive comity often is limited. 
This approach can be effective only when the anticompetitive effects of 
conduct affect not only the jurisdiction of the requesting nation but also that 
of the requested nation. If the conduct affects only the requesting nation, the 
requested nation has no reason to intervene to prohibit the conduct, which 
it actually may permit and encourage within its jurisdiction. For example, 
an export cartel is exempted from application of antitrust laws in the United 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Joined 
Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, & 125-129/85, A. Åhlström Osakeyhtiö v. Comm’n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193. 
 14. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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States under the Webb-Pomerene Act,15 and in Japan, under the Export and 
Import Transactions Law.16 Export cartels are allowed in other jurisdictions 
as well. 
Suppose that Japan requests to the United States that a Webb-Pomerene 
association of woodpulp should be prosecuted in the United States because 
it fixes the price of woodpulp to be exported to Japanese paper mills, 
injuring Japanese interests. Will the United States prosecute? In addition, if 
the United States asks Japan to prosecute a Japanese export cartel organized 
under the Export and Import Transactions Law because it fixes the export 
prices of a commodity exported to the United States, thereby burdening U.S. 
commerce, will Japan prosecute? The only answer in both cases seems to be 
that prosecution is not possible since it is exempted from the application of 
the domestic competition laws.  
In Nippon Paper,17 the cartel was created and partly carried out in Japan. 
However, the effects of this cartel were felt in the United States and not in 
Japan. The Japanese government did not do anything with regard to this 
cartel. Therefore, the question is whether it is realistic to expect the 
requested nation to invoke its domestic law to control conduct that is 
permitted under its own law. 
The GE-Honeywell merger is a case in point here. The merger took place 
in the United States and the U.S. authorities did not proceed against the 
merger, viewing the merger as permissible under U.S. antitrust laws. 
However, the European Commission considered this merger to be 
anticompetitive and proceeded against it. When the European Commission 
announced that it would prohibit this merger, U.S. officials stated that the 
European Commission and the United States differed substantially in 
their views regarding the merger. In this case, the application of positive 
comity is out of the question because the competition policies of the two 
nations regarding the same subject matter were not only different but also 
entirely inconsistent with each other. 
Despite its limited effectiveness, positive comity is a useful concept. It is 
more effective when the substance of the competition laws of participating 
nations is in harmony. A positive comity approach ultimately may prompt 
the parties to push forward the eventual harmonization of most, if not all, of 
their respective competition laws. 
Negative comity also is incorporated in a number of bilateral 
 15. Webb Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1994). 
 16. Yushutsunyu torihiki ho [Export and Import Transactions Law], Law No. 299 of 1952 as 
amended. 
 17. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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agreements. With negative comity, a party to a bilateral agreement refrains 
from applying its competition law to the conduct of an enterprise if such 
application collides with governmental policy of the other party. If, for 
example, a state applies its competition laws to prohibit an international 
merger and the merger is strongly promoted by the government of another 
state, such application may go against the policy of the latter state. In this 
situation, a negative comity approach suggests that the former state refrain 
from applying its competition law to that merger out of respect for the 
governmental policy of the latter state. 
There are antitrust cases in the United States in which courts expressed 
the principle of the “jurisdictional rule of reason” and suggested a number of 
factors to be taken into consideration when a country decides whether to 
apply its domestic competition law to conduct if such application is likely to 
have international implications.18 
D. Cooperation in Investigation  
When a country applies its domestic competition law to conduct that 
occurs abroad, the key issue is how to obtain evidence of a suspected 
violation. In a number of cases in which the United States applied antitrust 
laws to conduct abroad, extraterritorial investigations were conducted. This 
created numerous conflicts with other nations, occasionally resulting in the 
invocation of blocking statutes to prevent the United States from collecting 
evidence and testimony on foreign soil. In this respect, cooperation in 
investigation between the parties to an international agreement is useful in 
order to avoid such conflicts and effectively control conduct that occurs in 
the jurisdiction of one of the parties and brings about harm in that of the 
other. 
A number of bilateral agreements incorporate provisions for cooperation 
in investigation. Generally such provisions state that a party to the agreement 
endeavors to provide evidence to the other when requested without making 
the provision of information obligatory. The question is whether the 
provision of evidence and information can be made obligatory, and whether 
such evidence and information must include confidential information. In 
many jurisdictions, the disclosure of confidential information obtained 
through an investigation to any outside person (including a foreign 
government) is contrary to the confidentiality laws of that state. Presently, 
therefore, we must be satisfied with an international agreement that allows 
 
 18. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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for the voluntary provision of evidence and information, rather than a 
mandatory obligation to do so. 
Under the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act 
(IAEAA),19 the United States will investigate conduct that occurs in the 
United States and adversely affects the jurisdiction of another country, and 
transfer evidence obtained (including confidential evidence) to that country 
on the condition that the country enforce and reciprocate a comparable law 
on investigation. The underlying policy behind the IAEAA will enhance the 
effectiveness of domestic competition laws against anticompetitive conduct 
that cuts across national boundaries. Although the possibility that this type of 
agreement will be concluded is remote, it should be considered as a goal for 
the future. In addition, it is noteworthy that Article 26 of the U.S.-Japan 
Tax Treaty requires the parties to provide information and evidence 
(including confidential evidence) to each other. If it is possible in tax law, it 
may be possible in competition law. 
III. THE CONVERGENCE OF COMPETITION LAWS 
No matter how closely countries cooperate with each other in 
competition law enforcement, there is a limit to the effectiveness of such 
cooperation if there is a great divergence in the substance of the competition 
laws of the countries involved. Cooperation may be hampered if there is an 
inconsistency in the provisions of competition laws of different countries. In 
light of this, the convergence or harmonization of competition laws is, to a 
degree, indispensable in order to effectuate the cooperative relationship 
among countries in the enforcement of competition laws. 
A. The Convergence of Substantive Competition Laws 
Although the advance of globalization has caused the economic 
boundaries between nations to become less clear compared with when 
“nation-states” were in their heyday, it is still true that each nation-state 
jealously safeguards its sovereign right to control business activities in its 
own territory. Considering this state of affairs, any proposal for the 
convergence or harmonization of competition laws should aim to reduce or 
eliminate the harmful effects of anticompetitive conduct that cuts across 
borderlines without unduly encroaching upon purely domestic competition 
matters. Therefore, the primary objective of the convergence of competition 
 19. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA) of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-
6212 (1994). 
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laws should be to establish and declare principles that are essential for the 
maintenance of a liberal trade order. 
It is submitted that the following items should be considered: 
Anticompetitive conduct that directly affects the smooth operation of 
international trade and investment should be declared unlawful and each 
country that is a party to an international agreement should enact or amend 
its domestic law to carry out this mandate. This would include the 
prohibition of: (a) an international cartel that fixes prices or divides; (b) an 
export or import cartel that clearly restricts trade; (c) a boycott, the objective 
of which is to exclude foreign products; and (d) any activity, the primary 
purpose or impact of which is to exclude foreign commodities or enterprises 
and deny market access. It should be relatively easy to reach an agreement 
among trading nations that there should be promotion of international 
economic activities through the WTO and OECD.  
With regard to vertical restraints, price discrimination, and M & A that 
may or may not affect market access and the entry of foreign enterprises 
directly, the general policy should be that each country maintains its own 
right to control them. As long as the impact of conduct on market access by 
foreign enterprises is not certain (such as resale price maintenance which 
may or may not directly block the entry of competing foreign products), 
discretion should belong to each individual country.  
B. Convergence of the Enforcement Process 
There seem to be two major competition law enforcement systems: that 
of the United States and that of the European Union, with others falling on 
the spectrum in-between. For example, the Japanese enforcement system, 
which originally was based on the U.S. system, has deviated somewhat and 
now bears a closer resemblance to the European Union system. The U.S. 
system places a heavy emphasis on the criminal prosecution of cartels, the 
utilization of litigation by the government and private parties, and treble 
damage suits. On the other hand, the European Union system is 
characterized by an emphasis on the administrative process, such as the 
imposition of administrative fines and administrative orders restraining 
unlawful conduct.  
A competition law enforcement system reflects the legal history and 
traditions of the nation in which it operates, and a hasty transplant of one 
nation’s enforcement system to another with a different legal system has 
little chance of success. Any attempt to harmonize the enforcement process 
should not focus on the uniformity of the enforcement system at the expense 
of the traditions of national enforcement. A convergence or harmonization 
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of enforcement systems is probably more difficult than that of substantive 
laws.  
For the time being, an effort to harmonize the enforcement process 
should concentrate on such matters as the procedural due process of law and 
transparency of the enforcement process. An international agreement on 
competition policy should provide that the parties guarantee that the due 
process principle is observed whether it is an administrative, civil, or 
criminal process, that a well-founded complaint filed by a private party 
suffering from a violation is not rejected without good cause, that there shall 
be no distortion or disregard of duly filed evidence, and that the process as a 
whole generally is made public. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
